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Abstract
I see no good reason to prefer (any version I know of) the ‘holonomy interpre-
tation’ to the ‘potential interpretation’ of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Everyone
agrees that the inverse image [A] = [A + dλ]λ = d−1F of the electromagnetic
field F is a class, full of individuals; and that the circulation C of the electro-
magnetic potential A around a loop σ0 encircling the solenoid is common to the
whole class [A], and to the homotopy class or hoop [σ0]. If picking individuals
out of classes is the problem, picking an individual potential out of [A] should be
no worse than picking an individual loop out of [σ0]. The individuals of [A] can
moreover be transcended—punctually, without integration around loops—by an
appropriate version of the electromagnetic connection.
1 Introduction
Thales, one gathers, had nothing but water; then came atoms, fire, air, earth, effluvia,
fields, energy, waves and other complications. The history of ontological speculation
(to say nothing of my garden, §4.3) has now been enriched by loops—and perhaps
other boundaries too (§4.4).
The Aharonov-Bohm effect1 (§2) involves a relationship between variations in the
current through a solenoid and changes in the interference pattern on a screen. The re-
lationship is puzzling, but one can try to make sense of it in various ways. Of the avail-
able elements (electromagnetic field F in the solenoid, loops enclosing the solenoid,
wavefunction ψ, electromagnetic potential A, its circulation C around the loops, in-
terference pattern P, topological features), some can be chosen, others left out—with
philosophical tradeoffs. Accounts emphasising the relationship between ψ or P and F
(rather than A) are disturbingly nonlocal.2 The problem can be overcome3 by recog-
nising the existence of something like A or [A] or the electromagnetic connection; but
1Ehrenberg & Siday (1949), Aharonov & Bohm (1959); see also Franz (1939, 1940, 1965), Olariu &
Popescu (1985), Hiley (2013).
2Aharonov & Bohm (1959) p. 490: “we might try to formulate a nonlocal theory in which, for example,
the electron could interact with a field that was a finite distance away. Then there would be no trouble in
interpreting these results, but, as is well known, there are severe difficulties in the way of doing this.” See
also Healey (1997).
3Aharonov & Bohm (1959) pp. 490-1: “we may retain the present local theory and [ . . . ] try to give
a further new interpretation to the potentials. In other words, we are led to regard Aµ(x) as a physical
variable.” See also Feynman et al. (1964) §15-5.
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then there’s the (nontrivial) kernel of d : A 7→ F = dA, which corresponds to the
freedom
(1) [A] = [A+ dλ]λ = d−1F.
In the literature one finds enumerations of three or even four interpretations, which we
can call:
(I1) electromagnetic field interpretation
(I2) electromagnetic potential interpretation
(I3) holonomy4 interpretation
(I4) topology interpretation.
The topology interpretation (I4), dealt with in Afriat (2013), will not be considered
here. One can think of an annulus5 α between the solenoid and the surrounding wave-
function;6 the first three interpretations can be roughly distinguished by what they put
in α:
(I1) nothing at all
(I2) electromagnetic potential
(I3) loops.
Interpretations (I1) and (I3) are so embarrassed by the embarras de richesses (1) that
they altogether renounce the riches. In (I1) an empty annulus is simply accepted, what-
ever the consequences (again, a non-local influence between the electromagnetic field
in the solenoid and the wavefunction beyond the annulus); in (I3) the void is filled with
other embarrassing riches which are confidently passed off as altogether unembarrass-
ing. In any case it is better to overfill an awkward void, somehow or other, than to
leave it empty; so (I2) and (I3) are both preferable to (I1). This paper is about (I3), as
opposed to (I2) in particular. Again, I see no reason to prefer (I3) to (I2); the reason
(embarras de richesses) given for looking beyond (I2) to (I3) pertains to both, and is if
anything more problematic in (I3) than in (I2).
4The first two letters of “anholonomy” don’t seem semantically irrelevant, quite on the contrary; the
“a” looks very much like a transliterated alpha privative, which far from doing nothing at all would turn
“holonomy” into its opposite, “¬ holonomy.” One might imagine that the removal of the same two letters
would restore the meaning of “holonomy.” Not at all; by a prodigy of language and logic we have
holonomy ≡ ¬ holonomy.
“Holonomy” is often preferred to its anto-synonym (e´nantiose`me in French) “anholonomy.” Whether “holon-
omy” means “anholonomy” or the opposite is settled by context. I would only add to the confusion if I called
the interpretation based on anholonomies—departures from holonomy—the “anholonomy interpretation.”
5One may prefer to think in two or three dimensions; not knowing what to call a three-dimensional
annulus (“perforated cylinder”? “solid annulus”?) I’ll just say “annulus.”
6More details about the Aharonov-Bohm effect in §2. But it may already be helpful to imagine not one
but two concentric cylindrical shields: one keeping F in inside another keeping ψ out. To bring out the
nonlocal effect the distance, the annulus between the two shields can be made arbitrarily large.
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I often have trouble making up my mind, and can see that having options isn’t
always a good thing. But one mustn’t exaggerate: having options (as with [A]) can’t be
that bad. Can the presence of options really be so harmful as to justify their rejection
or even annihilation? The death of Buridan’s ass, if at all relevant, would stretch the
point about the dangers of having options, and how hard it can be to make up one’s
mind. Everyone agrees that the attractive transformation properties of quantities like C
or F can be interesting, important, physically relevant. Surely that can’t be the point;
it must be the fate, the contents of the annulus—which already contains what’s needed
to propagate an influence from the solenoid to the wavefunction. Does it really contain
too much? Must too much really amount to nothing at all? Does one really have to
dismiss the electromagnetic potential A because many potentials [A] correspond to F
and C? One can appreciate or even prefer quantities with attractive transformation
properties; but is that a reason to proscribe equivalence classes altogether? To try to
do physics without them? But this concerns (I1) more than (I3)—which has its own
embarrassing riches.
I mainly associate the holonomy interpretation (I3) with Richard Healey7 and Hol-
ger Lyre.8 Their interpretations do differ, and may even evolve; but such ideological
‘inhomogeneities’ complicate the study of almost any doctrine, be it the Copenhagen
interpretation or Marxism or Christianity or even spacetime substantivalism. I’ll some-
times speak of a generic “holonomist,” sometimes more specifically of Healey or Lyre;
and must already apologize for any inaccuracies in the attributions. The ‘philological,’
‘exegetical’ issues—what exactly the literature says—here are arduous and intricate. I
cannot claim to have dealt with them all, and leave any outstanding subtleties to more
able exegetes. My concerns are chiefly interpretational, philosophical, foundational,
in any case not philological; which admittedly raises the secondary issue of exactly
how the interpretations considered here relate to those in the literature. They will not,
I hope, be altogether unrelated, even if I sometimes idealise and simplify.
Whatever doubts or ambiguities there may be about the holonomy interpretation(s),
I think one can at least say this: The holonomist, grudging to pick an individual out
of the equivalence class [A],9 first dismisses the electromagnetic potential as a physi-
cally meaningless mathematical fiction;10 and then wants to transcend the individuals
with a loop integral which, being common to them all, is awarded an appropriate—
presumably ontological—primacy.11 The versions of the interpretation may then differ
as to exactly what philosophical capital is to be made out of the holonomic entities.
Against the holonomist it can be argued that appropriate electromagnetic properties
7Healey (1997, 2001, 2004, 2007)
8Lyre (2001, 2002, 2004a,b). Gordon Belot (1998) attaches ontological importance to holonomies—
without, however, preferring them to potentials. See also Wu & Yang (1975), Myrvold (2011).
9Healey (1999) p. 444: “The main problem with ONE TRUE GAUGE is epistemological: the theory itself
entails that we could never have any evidence that the TRUE GAUGE was ONE rather than ANOTHER.”
10See Nguyen, Teh, Wells (2018) on the status of structure often called “superfluous.”
11E. g. Healey (2007) p. 51: “If the value of the vector potentialAµ at each space-time point x in a region
does not represent some qualitative intrinsic physical properties in the vicinity of x, it may be that some
function of its integral around each closed curve C in that region does represent such properties of or at (the
image of) C. [ . . . ] Since the gauge dependence of the vector potential made it hard to accept Feynman’s
view that it is a real field that acts locally in the Aharonov-Bohm effect, there is reason to hope that a gauge-
invariant function of its line integral around closed curves might facilitate a local account of the action of
electromagnetism on quantum particles in the Aharonov-Bohm effect and elsewhere.”
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can be assigned to the points of the annulus (§4.1); and that an individual loop would
have to picked out of its own equivalence (homotopy) class, leaving us to wonder why
one equivalence class should be any worse than the other (§4.2).
A central notion here will be measurability: F and C can be measured, but notA—
for the time being at any rate. Indeed measurability is a complicated matter: what’s
unmeasurable today may not be tomorrow (or vice versa); it depends on the current
state of science, technology, ingenuity, economics and so forth; resources, instruments,
capabilities and possibilities available in one spacetime region may not be in another.
I’ll avoid the most absolute notion of measurability, as being too abstract to accept, and
will sometimes include a specification in square brackets: unmeasurable[today], for
instance, or measurability[Tuesday] or [with respect to theoretical stipulation S], un-
measurability[given the resources available in spacetime region R] or [with respect to
instrument ι]. Different contexts require different notions of measurability; no notion
will be given an absolute primacy, which transcends context. As to A, one should re-
ally say something like “A is unmeasurable[now]” or “A is unmeasurable[in the current
state of science and technology].” How do we know that “A will never be measured”
or “A is unmeasurable in principle”? Maudlin (1998, p. 367) writes that “since po-
tentials which differ by a gauge transformation generate identical effects, no amount
amount of observation could reveal the ONE TRUE GAUGE,” which I take to mean
“since potentials which differ by a gauge transformation generate identical effects for
the time being, no amount amount of observation[now] could reveal the ONE TRUE
GAUGE.”12
This is related to the matter of invariance under certain transformations. The point
is not that A can be transformed whereas F and C cannot (for they can); but that A,
being unmeasurable[for now], can be subjected to a transformation,
(2) A 7→ A′ = A+ dλ,
to which C and F , though functions of A, are indifferent. Whereas it makes sense to
say that “F (or C) is gauge invariant,” the meaning of “A is not gauge invariant” or “A
is gauge dependent” is less clear. Is it meant that A can be transformed? Of course it
can—but so can C and F , and in many different ways: C 7→ C+ ζ, F 7→ 2F etc. “A is
gauge dependent” may mean something like “C and F , which are functions of A, are
measurable, unlikeA itself; andA can be subjected to transformations that leave C and
F unchanged.”13 Shorthand I suppose, but not of the clearest sort.
12Cf. Healey (2007) pp. 113-4: “one cannot rule out a future extension of a Yang-Mills gauge theory
that permits observations whose results depend on the existence of a privileged gauge [ . . . ]. If that were
to happen, then his observations would discriminate in favor of an interpretation of the gauge theory that
commits it to such a privileged gauge, and against a holonomy interpretation. This has not yet happened.
But since we cannot be sure that it never will, it seems that we are in no position to answer the question
as to whether a holonomy interpretation is correct.” Belot (1998, footnote 17) seems to acknowledge the
possibility of physically different but empirically indistinguishable potentials A, A′ ∈ [A]—which makes
the empirical indistinguishability appear particularly contingent, perhaps even temporary. See also Aharonov
& Bohm (1959) p. 491: “we must be able to define the physical difference between two quantum states which
differ only by a gauge transformation” and Healey (2009).
13Lyre has it the other way around—the symmetry comes first, A is unmeasurable as a result: (2001)
p. S377 “The Reality of Gauge Potentials. “Only gauge-independent quantities are observable.””; p. S379
“holonomies are gauge-independent quantities and therefore appropriate candidates of observable entities”;
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The transformation (2) has to be understood in conjunction with the associated
phase transformation
(3) ψ 7→ eiλψ,
as Leeds (1999) has rightly emphasized. But it remains true that the gauge dependence
of A has above all to be understood in terms of the observability of F and C, and their
indifference to (2). If the λ of (2) & (3) were fixed by measurement (of phase or gauge),
both freedoms would disappear together.
Healey (2007) devotes much attention to quantized non-Abelian Yang-Mills the-
ory. I only14 consider electrodynamics—and hence U(1), rather than the non-Abelian
structure groups of general Yang-Mills theory—without quantization (beyond the in-
troduction of a wavefunction).
2 The Aharonov-Bohm effect
A few sentences about the Aharonov-Bohm effect: A wavefunction is split into two,
and these, having enclosed a (simply-connected) region ω containing a solenoid, are
made to interfere on a screen. The enclosing wavefunction is sensitive to any enclosed
electromagnetism inasmuch as the electromagnetic potential A contributes a phase
exp i
∮
∂ω
A
to (the wavefunction along) the boundary ∂ω ≡ σ0 and hence to the interference pattern
on the screen. The electromagnetism on ω is related to the circulation around the
boundary by Stokes’s theorem
C =
∮
∂ω
A =
∫∫
ω
dA.
The electromagnetic field15 F = dA produced by the solenoid is confined16 to a middle
region µ ⊂ ω surrounded by an isolating region17 α = ω−µ where F vanishes but not
A. Usually there’s just one (cylindrical) shield, around the solenoid; but for the clean
delimitation of an (arbitrarily large) intermediate annulus it can be useful to think of
two coaxial cylindrical shields: one keeping the electromagnetic field in inside a larger
one keeping the wavefunction out.
Varying the current through the solenoid changes the arbitrarily distant interference
pattern, which is perhaps surprising.
(2002) p. 82 “Der Eichsymmetrie zufolge lassen sich Eichpotentiale nicht direkt beobachten – nur eichinvari-
ante Gro¨ßen ko¨nnen observabel sein. [ . . . ] In den Eichtheorien sind diejenigen Entita¨ten, denen aufgrund
observabler Konsequenzen Realstatus zugebilligt werden muß, einerseits klarerweise nur bis auf Eichtrans-
formationen festgelegt [ . . . ].”
14Except in §4.1, but only for clarity of mathematical exposition.
15It is perhaps easiest to think of F as a purely magnetic fieldB produced by the current density J = d∗B
in the solenoid.
16Mattingly (2007) argues that the magnetic field is present on the annulus α, since its many components
are. Indeed they cancel by addition, but one can wonder about the physical meaning of the sum.
17Viewing µ and ω as concentric disks, which is convenient, makes their difference an annulus.
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3 The holonomy interpretation(s)
The holonomy interpretation involves appropriate versions of three ideas:
(i) [A] = [A+ dλ]λ = d−1F is a class, full of individuals
(ii) the circulation C is the same for all individuals of the classes [A] and [σ0]
(iii) transformation properties, symmetries are ontologically relevant.
But the holonomist seems to—indeed has to—go beyond all three. One can hardly
contest (i) or (ii), which are purely mathematical; and ideas18 along the lines of (iii)
go back to Cassirer (1921) or perhaps Einstein (1916, 1917)19 or even Klein (1872);
nor can the point be anything like the world is made of abstract structures or abstract
structures should be taken seriously,20 which may be right but not new, either; nor
can it be a mere extension of old ideas (about invariance or structures) to yet another
theory.21 One could argue about necessity (“physically real quantities have to be in-
variant”?) as opposed to sufficiency22 (“all invariant quantities are physically real”?),
but surely that’s a much more abstract issue that does not have to be discussed amid all
the intricate peculiarities of (even Abelian) Yang-Mills theory. Necessity is sometimes
quite plausible; sufficiency may be a bit strong, but frankly I don’t think that’s the real
issue here. So exactly what is the issue? An appropriate version of (iii) is combined
with (i) to rule out23 the physical reality of the potentialA, and an appropriate (perhaps
the same) version of (iii) is combined with (ii) to favour loops and/or anholonomies,
somehow or other. But that’s not enough, the holonomy interpretation can hardly stop
there, there has to be more. Something along the lines of a world made of loops? That
18See Afriat & Caccese (2010) p. 18.
19Einstein sometimes—but not always—gives the impression that transformation properties are ontologi-
cally irrelevant, e.g. (1918b) p. 167: “[Levi-Civita] (und mit ihm auch andere Fachgenossen) ist gegen eine
Betonung der Gleichung [∂ν(Tνσ + t
ν
σ) = 0] und gegen die obige Interpretation, weil die t
ν
σ keinen T e n -
s o r bilden. Letzteres ist zuzugeben; aber ich sehe nicht ein, warum nur solchen Gro¨ßen eine physikalische
Bedeutung zugeschrieben werden soll, welche die Transformationseigenschaften von Tensorkomponenten
haben.”
20On structural realism see for instance Poincare´ (1902, 1905), Cassirer (1921), Russell (1927), Worrall
(1989), French & Ladyman (2003), French (2006).
21Can the point just be that such and such a relationship between invariance and physical reality applies
not only to theories T1, T2, . . . , TN , as is well known, but even to TN+1 (which resembles T1, . . . , TN in
all relevant ways)?
22Cf. Healey (1997) p. 34: “since S(C) is gauge-invariant, it may readily be considered a physically real
quantity.”
23Lyre (2001) p. S377, Lyre (2004b) p. 665: “realists can hardly be satisfied by the gauge dependence
of entities as imminent in the A-interpretation [ . . . ].” Healey (1997) p. 22: “there is reason to doubt that
the magnetic vector potential is a physically real field, since A is not gauge-invariant, unlike the magnetic
field B [ . . . ].” Healey (1999) p. 445, Healey (2001) pp. 435-6, 454, Healey (2007) pp. 25-6, pp. 55-6:
“If there are new localized gauge properties, then neither theory nor experiment gives us a good grasp on
them. Theoretically, the best we can do is to represent them either by a mathematical object chosen more or
less arbitrarily from a diverse and infinite class of formally similar objects related to one another by gauge
transformations, or else by this entire gauge-equivalence class” and p. 118. Healey’s claim that theory itself
(rather than experimental limitations) rules out a choice of gauge is answered (by himself) in footnote 12
above. Cf. Maudlin (1998) pp. 366-7, Leeds (1999) p. 610, Mattingly (2006) p. 251, Healey (2009) p. 707:
“It is especially hard when it is the theory itself that provides our only initial access to those features of
situations it represents by newly introduced structures—hard, but not impossible.”
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would be a bold, original, interesting idea—even more interesting if it were right. Let
us try to understand what exactly the holonomist may have in mind.
3.1 Is an integral a property of its domain of integration?
The holonomist could argue as follows: To avoid the nonlocality of (I1) there has to
be something electromagnetic in the annulus α. But what electromagnetic entities are
available there? Again, the holonomist24 dismisses A, or even all of [A], by combining
(i) with an appropriate version of (iii). What’s left in α? The circulation C, the (‘once
around the solenoid’25) hoop and the loops it contains. As electromagnetic property
present in α the holonomist can pick C, appealing to (ii) together with an appropriate
version of (iii).26 Now that a property has been chosen for α, there remains the issue of
what it belongs to. Assigning C to points, or even larger regions, wouldn’t make sense,
as an entirely gratuitous and uninteresting constant would result. What else could the
electromagnetic property C belong to? A clue is provided by the following trivial
example: The circumference 2pir of a circle is a property of the ‘domain of integration,’
the perimeter. Could the integral C also belong to its domain of integration,27 in much
the same way? In our electromagnetic case, what is the domain of integration? A
circle, as in the trivial example? Almost—what’s needed is a circle up to appropriate
(‘homotopic’) deformations, in other words a hoop. So one holonomy interpretation
could amount to this: The integral C is a property of its domain of integration (just as
the circumference was a property of the perimeter).
But can the assignment of an integral to its domain of integration really help us
understand the Aharonov-Bohm effect? Can it fill α with a ‘carrier’ medium that deals
with the problem of non-locality by transmitting the influence from the solenoid to the
wavefunction? One can wonder. So the holonomist may have to go beyond that assign-
ment of an integral to its domain of integration, and make physical (or metaphysical
or ontological) claims about the loops in the domain of integration—maybe along the
lines of loops are real or loops really exist or since loops do the work, they must really
be there or even the world is made of loops.
This is a position that, whatever its origin, is at least worth mentioning. I think it
resembles Healey’s version, or one of Healey’s versions, of the holonomy interpreta-
tion,28 but I may be wrong. Rather than dwell on the philological issue of exactly how
24Unlike Healey, who denies any physical reality to the class [A] (and all its individuals), Lyre (2002)
seems to have no objection to the equivalence class; p. 82: “Eine genauere Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass
nicht den Eichpotentialen, sondern nur A¨quivalenzklassen von Potentialen [ . . . ] bzw. den so genannten
Holonomien ontologische Significanz zukommt [ . . . ].”
25By hoop I’ll always mean this homotopy class in particular (rather than the classes corresponding to
‘around twice’ or ‘around thrice’ etc.).
26Healey (2007) p. 105: “The non-localized gauge potential properties view is motivated by the idea that
the structure of gauge potential properties is given by the gauge-invariant content of a gauge theory. The
most direct way to implement this idea would be to require that the gauge potential properties are just those
that are represented by gauge-invariant magnitudes. [ . . . ] While the vector potentialAµ is gauge dependent,
its line integral S(C) =
∮
C Aµdx
µ around a closed curve C is gauge invariant.
27The domain of integration is often a set. Here a set would work, but something weaker is enough: the
notion of ‘once around the solenoid.’
28The following may be relevant: Healey (2001) p. 449: “What is distinctive is not the properties repre-
sented by holonomies but the nature of the object whose properties they are. On the present view, holonomies
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this first holonomy interpretation relates to ideas from the literature, I’ll move on to a
second holonomy interpretation.
3.2 Is the world made of loops?
This second holonomy interpretation is more straightforward than the first. Briefly, it
emphasises the ontological primacy of loops (without bothering to point out that an
integral belongs to its domain of integration): Some physical entity has to do the job,
convey the influence; if the embarrassing riches of [A] are dispensed with, what’s left
in the annulus α? Loops—or rather the (more discreetly) embarrassing riches of the
homotopy class [σ0]. This second interpretation can be attributed to Lyre (2001),29
Lyre (2004a),30 Lyre (2004b),31 or again to Healey (2001),32 Healey (2007).33
In §4.2 I’ll argue as follows: A and σ0 are related by a significant duality, so that
however one feels about the class [A] (or its elements), it is no worse than the hoop
represent global properties of a loop that are not determined by any intrinsic properties of the points on that
loop.” Healey (2007) p. xviii: “In the simplest case (classical electromagnetism interacting with quantum
particles) such an account ascribes properties to (or on) a loop of empty space that are not fixed by prop-
erties of anything located at points around the loop [ . . . ].” P. 31: “But if the holonomies directly represent
electromagnetism and its effects, then there is still a sense in which the action of electromagnetism on the
electrons is not completely local, since holonomies attach to extended curves rather than points.” P. 56: “only
gauge-invariant functions of these mathematically localized fields directly represent new electromagnetic
properties; and these are predicated of, or at, arbitrarily small neighborhoods of loops in space-time—i.e.
oriented images of closed curves on the space-time manifold.” P. 74: “This makes it plausible to maintain
that what an SU(2) Yang-Mills theory ultimately describes is not a localized field represented by a gauge
potential, but a set of intrinsic properties of what I have simply called loops [ . . . ].” P. 106: “we arrive at
the view that non-localized EM potential properties in a region are represented by the holonomies [ . . . ] of
all closed curves in the region [ . . . ]. This is the interpretation of classical electromagnetism I shall defend.”
P. 118: “One can reformulate the theory as a theory of holonomy properties, so that it does not even appear
to mention localized gauge potential properties.” P. 185: “gauge potentials directly represent no localized
gauge properties, but rather indirectly represent non-localized holonomy properties.” P. 220: “[ . . . ] the
Aharonov-Bohm effect and other related effects provide vivid examples of physical processes that seem
best accounted for in terms of non-localized holonomy properties [ . . . ].” P. 221: “Should we believe that
non-separable processes involving non-localized holonomy properties are responsible for phenomena like
the Aharonov-Bohm effect? This belief may be encouraged by the predictive successes consequent upon in-
troducing classical electromagnetism into the quantum mechanics of particles.” P. 225: “This reinforces the
conclusion that the evidence for contemporary gauge theories lends credence to the belief that these describe
non-separable processes, while nothing in the world corresponds to or is represented by a locally defined
gauge potential.” See also the last paragraph of the book pp. 227-8.
29P. S379: “We [ . . . ] should consider holonomies as physically real.” P. S380: “We may very well
represent the physically significant structures in an ontological universe consisting of matter-fields, gauge
field strengths, and holonomies.”
30P. 116: “Die Entita¨ten der Eichtheorien sind Holonomien [ . . . ].”
31P. 665-6: “we may still consider holonomies as object-like entities, but to such an extent that our notion
of an object becomes highly abstract.” Lyre (p. 658) sees holonomies as “basic entities” and “genuine enti-
ties.” Belot (2003) p. 216 has a similar position—without, however, going so far as to claim that loops are
more real: “holonomies [ . . . ] are well-defined quantities on the spaces of states of the standard formulations
of Yang-Mills theories. If it is accepted that these theories describe reality, does not it follow that the quan-
tities in question are as real as any others?” See also Belot (1998) p. 544: “we must also consider closed
curves in space to be carriers of the electromagnetic predicates” and the final paragraph pp. 553-4.
32P. 448: “it is the holonomies that represent the real physical structures in a gauge situation, rather than
any particular bundle connection that is compatible with them.”
33P. 30: “Suppose instead that one takes the holonomies themselves directly to represent electromagnetism
and its effects on quantum particles.”
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[σ0] (or its elements). I’ll think of A as a set {σ1, . . . , σN} of level curves, which
can indeed be deformed (by (2))—but so can σ0. The deformability of σ1, . . . , σN , or
rather σ0, . . . , σN , is neither here nor there, and shouldn’t be used to rule out the reality
of A in particular.
I also explore (§§4.3,4.4) the relationship between the measurability of a quantity
(say A) and the ontic status of a boundary; can the measurement of one entity under-
mine the physical reality of another, ferrying it off to a shadier realm of mathematical
fictions?
3.3 Summary
Before turning to my objections, I can try to summarize the holonomy intepretation(s):
The electromagnetic field F and inverse image [A] = d−1F are measurable, but not the
individual potential A—whose physical reality is therefore questionable. But surely
the Aharonov-Bohm effect has to be conveyed by something. If the potential isn’t
really there, what’s left? The solenoid, and the electromagnetic field it contains, are
(arbitrarily) far from the wavefunction and the screen on which the effect is seen. The
circulation C, which determines the interference pattern, has a promising indifference
to (2); but C is just a number, not enough on its own to convey or account for the
effect—something more is presumably sought. The number is obtained by integrating
anyA ∈ [A] around any σ0 ∈ [σ0]; having ruled outA, the holonomist attributes reality
to σ0 (or [σ0]) instead. As a compressed statement we can adopt S: Since [A] is a class
it cannot be taken seriously; physical meaning should be attributed to the class [σ0]
instead.
4 Objections
4.1 The connection
Again, if it were possible to fill the annulus α uncontroversially with appropriate elec-
tromagnetic properties, there would be no reason to look beyond the potential inter-
pretation (I2). Indeed the holonomist’s first step, to make the abstractions of (I3) seem
indispensable, is to dismiss A as a meaningless mathematical fiction: A does not as-
sign a propertyAx to the physical point x because there are so many other potentials in
[A]. The move can be countered by producing an electromagnetic function ϕ, closely
related to A, that does assign a property ϕx to every x.
Structure often called ‘surplus’—gauge, components etc.—can sometimes be tran-
scended by appropriate geometrical abstractions; so one can take the one-form A =
Aµdx
µ rather than its components Aµ with respect to this or that basis dxµ, the tensor
T = Tµνσ∂µ ⊗ dxν ⊗ dxσ
rather than its components Tµνσ and so on. Can something similar be attempted here?
Healey (1999, p. 445) writes that “one can represent the gauge potential in a gauge-
independent way as a connection one-form on a principal fiber bundle [ . . . ].” Since the
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fiber of the principal bundle34 P = M ×G is the structure group G, which represents
local gauge transformations and freedom, the way may not be as “gauge-independent”
as he suggests, but we can try to get around the problem. By “gauge-independent”
Healey no doubt means something like ‘invariant’ or ‘geometrical’ or ‘equivariant’:
the dependence on G (which generalises the U(1) phase transformation (3)) can be
balanced by something along the lines of (2) to produce a higher invariance expressed
in the Lagrangian or field equations or elsewhere. But even if the local dependence on
the structure group can thus be overcome somewhere or other by means of appropriate
compensation, G remains undeniably present on the principal bundle. So we have to
find a way of descending from the principal bundle to M , to whose points we want to
assign the electromagnetic property. There will be no attempt to do away with gauge
freedom altogether; rather, it will be shown that such freedom by no means prevents
the assignment of an appropriate electromagnetic property to each point of the annulus.
Properties in modern physics, when unpacked, can have plenty of internal structure:
many apparently simple properties are in fact functions, equivalence classes, tensors
etc. Here, nothing prevents us from reorganising the elements of P so as to turn the
fiber G into the domain of a function ϕ on M , whose value
ϕx : Gx → [HxP ]; g 7→ ϕx(g) = H(x,g)P
at x ∈M would then be the required electromagnetic property, the range
[HxP ] = [H(x,Gx)P ] = [H(x,g)P ]g
being the class of horizontal subspaces35 assigned by the connection to x, one for every
g ∈ Gx. Again, gauge freedom is still there, but at least we have a single electromag-
netic property at x—single by the standards of internal structure typical to physics,
to modern physics at any rate. Cardinality (or perhaps the grammatical category of
number—singular, plural) is not invariant under mathematical reformulation: a rear-
rangement of the principal bundle has taken us from the embarrassing riches of [Ax] to
the single property ϕx.
Again, the holonomist argument amounts to this: the individuals are a nuisance
and have to be transcended; at a point we’re stuck with them, they simply cannot be
dispensed with: hence integration, loops etc. So the crucial move to loops and inte-
gration is only justified by the supposed impossibility of getting rid of the individu-
als of [A] at a point x; if they could already be punctually transcended, why bother
with integration? Healey has to claim that it is mathematically impossible to define
an object (potential or connection or covariant derivative or whatever) at point x that
34The base spaceM is flat spacetime (or even just space; time has an uninteresting roˆle here). We can take
the principal bundle to be trivial, in other words a Cartesian product, with no relevant loss of generality. Cf.
Healey (1999) p. 445: “a gauge potential is more appropriately represented mathematically not as a vector
field defined on spacetime points, but rather as a connection one-form on a principal fiber bundle over (some
region of) spacetime. It is only when this bundle representation is trivial that the older vector representation
of the potential is even possible. That is always the case for Maxwellian electromagnetism defined over
Minkowski spacetime, but it is not true if one allows for the possibility of magnetic monopoles.”
35Such a subspace indicates how the element g ∈ Gx gets radiated linearly from x to the surrounding
points ofM ; since each element g of each copyGx ofG has to be radiated separately, the connection assigns
a horizontal subspace to each point of the principal bundle.
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corresponds—without integration—to the whole class [Ax]. His argument36 seems to
be that since one can always introduce the individuals, since one can always talk about
them, they can’t be eliminated. It is undeniably true that the individuals can always be
introduced or referred to; indeed one has to be able to introduce them; vertical automor-
phisms or equivalent operations are always available, however abstract or geometrical
the formulation. But the individuals can nonetheless be transcended, packed away out
of sight, by means of appropriate constructions or reformulations.
Picking individuals (gauge fixing) and transcending them may look like incompat-
ible solutions. Perhaps; but at worst a choice would be forced—pending which, both
remain available.
4.2 Duality between loops and potentials
There is a significant duality between loops and potentials; just as a vector σ˙′0(x) ∈
TxM and a covector A(x) from the dual space T ∗xM give a number 〈A(x), σ˙′0(x)〉,
the loop37 σ0 ≡ ∂ω and potential give a number (A, σ0) = C. Both A and σ0 can be
deformed without affecting the circulation: the potential according to (2); a loop can be
deformed into any other loop going around the solenoid once. Both could be replaced
by their equivalence classes [A] and [σ0], one could even write ([A], [σ0]) = C.
It will be useful to understand the transformation (2) more geometrically, as a de-
formation of the level sets of A’s local primitive38 σ.39 One can first imagine a purely
‘angular’ or ‘radial’ σ (with values running from zero to 2pik = C),40 whose level lines
are straight rays radiating through the annulus α from the inner disk µ to the edge ∂ω.
A gauge transformation (2) would then deform the level rays, bending them without
making them cross. It is easier to picture the denumerable set {σ1, . . . , σN} of level
curves at intervals of C/N than all of them; they will each be cut once41 by any loop
σ0 going around the solenoid once.
In this construction we have N + 1 deformable curves σ0, . . . , σN , which all seem
pretty much on the same footing; S amounts to the surprising claim that S′: Only σ0
is physically real (along with its deformations) because the other curves σ1, . . . , σN
can be deformed. Why should one curve σk be any better than the others? How about
σ7? It remains true that σ0, . . . , σ6, σ8, . . . , σN can be deformed.
To emphasize that loops are no better than A, we can even arrange for a gauge
transformation to induce a loop deformation (thus strengthening the duality): Level
rays of unit length determine a unit circle, which will then be ‘deflated’ into a smaller
loop by a gauge transformation (2); to every such transformation there corresponds a
different loop σλ0 . If a potential subject to (2) is too flimsy to exist, why should loops
also subject to (2) be any better? Are vectors any more real than the covectors dual
361999 p. 446, 2001 p. 436ff., 2004 p. 628
37The unparametrized curve σ0 ⊂ M is the image of the parametrized curve σ′0 : I → M ; t 7→ σ′0(t),
without its parameter t, which is not part of the boundary ∂ω (where I ⊂ R is an appropriate interval).
38For wherever A is closed it can be written locally as the gradient A = dσ of a zero-form σ.
39A similar construction is used in Afriat (2013).
40Such a σ cannot be continuous everywhere; we can imagine a single discontinuity, say on the ray with
values σ = 2pink, where the integer n is zero then one, k = C/2pi being a constant.
41Or rather an odd number of times, as Jean-Philippe Nicolas has pointed out to me. Crossings in opposite
directions cancel, and add nothing to the integral.
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to them? Is a Lagrangian ontologically inferior to the Hamiltonian dual to it? Does
momentum exist more than velocity?
Healey’s agenda is undermined by the possibility of constructing, without integra-
tion, an appropriate electrogeometrical object ϕ with a single value ϕx at every point
x. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that such an object cannot be constructed, as
indeed Healey has to claim. He still has to establish that the individuals of the equiv-
alence class [A] are more troublesome than those of the hoop [σ0]. Again, I’ve argued
that there’s a significant duality between the two, and that [A] is no worse than [σ0].
Or even somewhat better: Since the hoop [σ0] is more homogeneous than [A], it makes
more sense to pick a potential out of [A] than to pick a loop out of [σ0]; the elements of
[σ0] all look about the same, whereas [A] contains distinguished elements that stand out
from the rest. Gauge fixing is an accepted and legitimate practice—but who would ever
indulge in loop fixing, picking an individual loop out of [σ0], preferring it to the others?
(Would ellipses be better than other loops? How about roughly octogonal loops?)
4.3 Vertical drop
Suppose I can only measure the curl F = dA of my garden’s gradient42 (or infinites-
imal vertical drop) A but not the gradient itself—some instruments and experimental
possibilities are available, others aren’t.43 The indifference of F = dA + d2λ to the
exact one-form dλ can accordingly be called a gauge freedom. The vertical drop or
rather circulation
C =
∮
∂ω
A =
∫∫
ω
dA
is also indifferent to (2), where ∂ω is the boundary of a region ω.
The unmeasurability[in an appropriate spacetime region] ofAmakes my garden an
awkward tangle of real physical loops by producing the gauge freedom which in turn
invests the boundary ∂ω (or [∂ω]) with physical reality. But to dispatch the loops to
the shady regions (populated by innocuous mathematical ghosts) where they obstruct
neither gardening nor evening strolls it may be enough to work out how to measure A;
for that could change the status of (2) and hence of the loops.
We know that peeking can kill a cat (Schro¨dinger, 1935); but here, peeking at a
gradient may well annihilate a loop!
4.4 Electrostatics, gravity
The solenoid, or perhaps the field F = dA it produces, is a source whose ‘radiation’ A
is caught by the boundary ∂ω, giving the circulation C.
In electrostatics the source is a charge density three-form ρ = dE, which radiates
the electric two-formE caught by the boundary ∂Ω of a region Ω containing ρ. Stokes’s
theorem again holds, and allows us to write
F =
∫∫
∂Ω
E =
∫∫∫
Ω
dE =
∫∫∫
Ω
ρ.
42Needless to say, most gardens have an exact gradient.
43Again, there can be other instruments and experimental possibilities in other spacetime regions; experi-
mental possibility may or may not be shared between regions.
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The difference here is that, unlike F ’s primitive A, ρ’s primitive E is measurable (and
fixed by the condition E = ∗dϕ, the electrostatic potential ϕ being a zero-form). F and
ρ can nonetheless be called ‘gauge invariant,’ in the sense that they’re indifferent to the
gauge transformation
(4) E 7→ E′ = E+ dβ,
where dβ is the curl of a one-form β. To make the gauge transformation (4) physically
meaningful, one would have to forget how to measure E.44 Once E is empirically
inaccessible, (4) will acquire a different status, and so will the boundary ∂Ω. If we then
feel trapped inside an infinite gauge-invariant class [∂Ω] of real physical membranes,
it may be enough, to dissolve them all, to remember how to measure E.
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Newton-Poisson gravity, where ρ is the
mass density, ϕ the gravitational potential etc.45
The same also applies to the Aharonov-Bohm effect itself: Suppose an ingenious
experimenter works out how to measure A. That would change the status of (2)—
it would be taken less seriously—and hence of ∂ω, which would undergo an ontic
transition. We have something like a ‘law of ontological conservation’: if the reality
isn’t here (A), and it has to be somewhere, it must be there (∂ω); but if it is here, it no
longer has to be there . . .
5 Final remarks
We all agree that (1) is a class, full of individuals; and that the integral C of the elec-
tromagnetic potential A around a loop σ0 is common to the whole class [A], and to
the hoop [σ0]. Surely the holonomist has to go beyond a re-statement of those incon-
trovertible mathematical facts, to make a physical or metaphysical point of some sort.
The language used suggests it is an ontological point, involving integrals around loops.
The integral here is just a number—about which it seems hard to make interesting on-
tological claims. Who would dispute that C is important or physically relevant? Is the
claim that the number exists? Or that it represents a physical quantity? If the holonomy
interpretation is to go beyond the mere number C, it seems obliged to make ontological
claims about loops, along the lines of loops are physically real or loops really exist or
the world is made of loops.
Picking a potential A out of [A] seems no worse than picking a loop σ0 out of the
hoop [σ0]. There may be reasons to prefer [A] to any particular potential A, and to
prefer [σ0] to any particular loop σ0; but those reasons are not good reasons to prefer
[σ0] to [A], or any particular σ0 to any particular A; nor are they good reasons to prefer
[σ0] to any particular A (or [A], for that matter, to any particular σ0).
We owe the embarrassing riches of (1) to the unmeasurability of potentials, about
which I have raised questions in §§4.3-4.4. It is remarkable that the empirical inacces-
sibility of a differential form ζ on Ω should confer physical reality on the boundary
44It is by no means impossible to make a quantity unmeasurable; one can destroy instruments, abolish
know-how, banish specialists and so on. Measurability is as reversible as progress.
45See Afriat (2013).
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∂Ω. If the ‘potential’ represented by ζ sooner or later becomes measurable, will the
boundary ∂Ω fade and dissolve?
I thank Stefano Bordoni, Ermenegildo Caccese, Claudio Calosi, Adam Caulton, Den-
nis Dieks, Johan Huisman, Antonio Masiello, Jean-Philippe Nicolas, John Norton
and Brian Pitts for valuable comments; and Dimitri Kasprzyk for telling me about
e´nantiose`mes.
References
Afriat, A. (2013) “Topology, holes and sources” International Journal of Theoretical
Physics 52, 1007-12
Afriat, A. and E. Caccese (2010) “The relativity of inertia and reality of nothing” Stud-
ies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41, 9-26
Aharonov, Y. and D. Bohm (1959) “Significance of electromagnetic potentials in the
quantum theory” Physical Review 115, 485-91
Anandan, J. (1983) “Holonomy groups in gravity and gauge fields” in G. Denardo
and H. Doebner (editors) Proceedings of the Conference on Differential Geometric
Methods in Physics, Trieste 1981, World Scientific, Singapore
Barrett, J. (1991) “Holonomy and path structures in general relativity and Yang-Mills
theory” International Journal of Theoretical Physics 30, 1171-1215
Baum, H. (2009) Eichfeldtheorie: eine Einfu¨hrung in die Differentialgeometrie auf
Faserbu¨ndeln, Springer, Berlin
Belot, G. (1998) “Understanding electromagnetism” The British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science 49, 531-55
Belot, G. (2003) “Symmetry and gauge freedom” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics 34, 189-225
Cassirer, E. (1921) Zur Einstein’schen Relativita¨tstheorie, Bruno Cassirer, Berlin
Ehrenberg, W. and R. Siday (1949) “The refractive index in electron optics and the
principles of dynamics” Proceedings of the Physical Society B 62, 8-21
Einstein, A. (1916) “Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie” Annalen der
Physik 49, 769-822
Einstein, A. (1917) “Zum Quantensatz von Sommerfeld und Epstein” Verhandlungen
der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft 19, 82-92
Feynman, R., R. Leighton and M. Sands (1964) The Feynman lectures on physics,
volume 2, Addison-Wesley, Reading
14
Franz, W. (1939) “Elektroneninterferenzen im Magnetfeld” Verhandlungen der
Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft 20, 65-6
Franz, W. (1940) “Elektroneninterferenzen im Magnetfeld” Physikalische Berichte 21,
686
Franz, W. (1965) “Elektroneninterferenzen im Magnetfeld” Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 184,
85-91
French, S. (2006) “Structure as a weapon of the realist” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
society 106, 1-19
French, S. and J. Ladyman (2003) “Remodelling structural realism: quantum physics
and the metaphysics of structure” Synthese 136, 31-56
Healey, R. (1997) “Nonlocality and the Aharonov-Bohm effect” Philosophy of Science
64, 18-41
Healey, R. (1999) “Quantum analogies: a reply to Maudlin” Philosophy of Science 66,
440-7
Healey, R. (2001) “On the reality of gauge potentials” Philosophy of Science 68, 432-
55
Healey, R. (2004) “Gauge theories and holisms” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics 35, 619-42
Healey, R. (2007) Gauging what’s real: the conceptual foundations of contemporary
gauge theories, Oxford University Press, New York
Healey, R. (2009) “Perfect symmetries” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 60, 697-720
Hiley, B. (2013) “The early history of the Aharonov-Bohm effect” arXiv:1304.4736v1
[physics.hist-ph]
Kola´rˇ, I., P. Michor and J. Slova´k (1993) Natural operators in differential geometry,
Springer, Berlin
Klein, F. (1872) Vergleichende Betrachtungen u¨ber neuere geometrische Forschungen,
Deichert, Erlangen
Leeds, S. (1999) “Gauges: Aharonov, Bohm, Yang, Healey” Philosophy of Science 66,
606-27
Lyre, H. (2001) “The principles of gauging” Philosophy of Science 68, S371-81
Lyre, H. (2002) “Zur Wissenschaftstheorie moderner Eichfeldtheorien” in A. Beck-
ermann and C. Nimtz (editors) Argument & Analyse – Sektionsvortra¨ge, Mentis,
Paderborn
15
Lyre, H. (2004a) Lokale Symmetrien und Wirklichkeit: eine Naturphilosophische
Studie u¨ber Eichtheorien und Strukturenrealismus, Mentis, Paderborn
Lyre, H. (2004b) “Holism and structuralism in U (1) gauge theory” Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35, 643-70
Mattingly, J. (2006) “Which gauge matters” Studies in History and Philosophy of Mod-
ern Physics 37, 243-62
Mattingly, J. (2007) “Classical fields and quantum time-evolution in the Aharonov-
Bohm effect” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38, 888-905
Maudlin, T. (1998) “Healey on the Aharonov-Bohm effect” Philosophy of Science 65,
361-8
Myrvold, W. (2011) “Nonseparability, classical and quantum” The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 62, 417-32
Nguyen, J., N. Teh and L. Wells (2018) “Why surplus structure is not superfluous”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Olariu, S. and I. Popescu (1985) “The quantum effects of electromagnetic fluxes” Re-
views of Modern Physics 57, 339-436
Poincare´, H. (1902) La science et l’hypothe`se, Flammarion, Paris
Poincare´, H. (1905) La valeur de la science, Flammarion, Paris
Russell, B. (1927) The analysis of matter, Kegan Paul, London
Schro¨dinger, E. (1935) “Die gegenwa¨rtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik” Natur-
wissenschaften 23, 807-12, 823-8, 844-9
Worrall, J. (1989) “Structural realism: the best of both worlds?” Dialectica 43, 99-124
Wu, T. and C. Yang (1975) “Concept of nonintegrable phase factors and global formu-
lation of gauge fields” Physical Review D 12, 3845-57
16
